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Abstract 
"The Long Exception" examines the period from Franklin Roosevelt to the end of the 
twentieth century and argues that the New Deal was more of an historical aberration— 
a byproduct of the massive crisis of the Great Depression—than the linear triumph of 
the welfare state. The depth of the Depression undoubtedly forced the realignment of 
American politics and class relations for decades, but, it is argued, there is more 
continuity in American politics between the periods before the New Deal order and 
those after its decline than there is between the postwar era and the rest of American 
history. Indeed, by the early seventies the arc of American history had fallen back 
upon itself. While liberals of the seventies and eighties waited for a return to what they 
regarded as the normality of the New Deal order, they were actually living in the final 
days of what Paul Krugman later called the "interregnum between Gilded Ages." The 
article examines four central themes in building this argument: race, religion, class, and 
individualism. 
/ 
In 1883, influential Yale Professor and social Darwinist William Graham 
Sumner took to the lectern to address the topic of "The Forgotten Man." In 
his address he criticized the misguided sentimentality of Gilded Age reformers 
who pitied the undeserving poor while overlooking the noble and uncomplain-
ing worker who quietly toiled away and played by the rules. "Now who is the 
Forgotten Man?," he queried his audience. "He is the simple honest laborer, 
ready to earn his living by productive work," he answered. "We pass by him 
because he is independent, self supporting, and asks no favors." For Sumner, 
overlooking the industrious worker in favor of assisting the "nasty, shiftless, 
criminal, whining, crawling, and good-for-nothing people" was a tragedy. The 
honest working man deserved respect, asking only his liberty in exchange. 
Sumner's argument was more than a justification for ignoring the poor, 
however; it was also a clever attempt to make the working man and his sym-
pathizers among the upper classes into allies in his project to discredit reform 
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as well as divide the working class from the poor. "It is clear now," he concluded 
his speech, "that the interest of the Forgotten Man and the interest of the 'the 
poor," 'the weak,' and the other petted classes are in antagonism."1 
The long accepted outline of the twentieth century chronicles the defeat of 
such social Darwinist thinking. Sumner's politics—and, more importantly, his 
hoped-for alliances—ended, the textbook argument suggests, as the ideological 
battles and naked class conflict of the Gilded Age were finally tamed by the sym-
pathy of middle-class Progressives and ultimately brought to heel with the 
triumph of the New Deal. 
Not surprising, then, the second significant mention of the "Forgotten 
Man" in American political thought was when Franklin Roosevelt ran for the 
Democratic nomination in 1932. In his famous campaign speech, "The 
Forgotten Man," Roosevelt laid out a very different idea, seeking favor with a 
broad coalition of working people both employed and unemployed. "These 
unhappy times," he proclaimed as the Great Depression dragged through its 
third consecutive, dismal year, "call for the building of plans that rest upon 
the forgotten, the unorganized but indispensable units of economic power, for 
plans like those of 1917, that build from the bottom up and not from the top 
down, that put their faith once more in the forgotten man at the bottom of 
the economic pyramid." He sought to unite "Main Street, Broadway, the 
mines, the mills" and farmers in a vision of shared sacrifice, accountability, 
and recovery that would, by the dawn of Roosevelt's second term in 1937, 
have enrolled millions of working-class and poor Americans together into 
what appeared to be a semi-permanent political coalition based on a new idea 
of collective economic citizenship.2 
Less than two generations later, Richard Nixon invoked yet another 
"Forgotten Man" that helped to undo Roosevelt's version and harkened back 
to Sumner's. Accepting the 1968 nomination of the Republican Party, he 
returned to separating the nobility of the common man from the misguided 
pity of the do-gooders. He asked that the nation listen to the "quiet voice in 
the tumult of the shouting. It is the voice of the great majority of Americans, 
the forgotten Americans, the non shouters, the non demonstrators.... They 
work in American factories, they run American businesses. They serve in gov-
ernment; they provide most of the soldiers who die to keep it free. They give 
drive to the spirit of America. They give lift to the American dream. They 
give steel to the backbone of America. They're good people. They're decent 
people; they work and they save and they pay their taxes and they care." 
Taking his political tutorials from George Wallace, Nixon went on to tap into 
and promote the cause of the disgruntled, confused, angry, and forgotten 
(white) working man, and, like Sumner, sought to separate the honest worker 
from threats just below him in the economic pyramid—as well as, more impor-
tantly, the meddlesome sympathies of the reformers.3 
Much of postwar historical writing is informed by an unconscious Whiggish 
climb from Sumner's to Roosevelt's visions of the "Forgotten Man." But from 
the standpoint of the twenty-first century. Roosevelt's version now seems less 
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of a liberal triumph than it does a historical aberration—a byproduct of the 
massive crisis of the Great Depression rather than the linear triumph of the 
liberal state. The depth of the Depression undoubtedly forced the realignment 
of American politics and class relations for decades, but, we argue, there is more 
continuity in American political culture between Sumner and Nixon than 
between Roosevelt and the rest of American history. William Leuchtenburg 
famously saw every president since the Second World War as In the Shadow 
of FDR, but it might be more accurate to reframe the historical portraiture so 
as to picture FDR fading into the dark shadows of American history itself. 
Indeed, by the early seventies the arc of American history had fallen back 
upon itself. While liberals of the seventies and eighties waited for a return to 
what they regarded as the normality of the New Deal order, they were actually 
living in the final days of what Paul Krugman later called the "interregnum 
between Gilded Ages."4 
How best, then, to frame the New Deal in American history? The historian 
Robert Zieger once referred to the labor movement that burst upon the national 
stage during the 1930s and 1940s as a "fragile juggernaut."5 Perhaps no better 
metaphor could describe the broader political culture that came of age under 
Franklin Roosevelt. The New Deal alliances seemed like an all-powerful force 
capable of implementing its progressive liberal policy regardless of conservative 
opposition. Yet simultaneously, when challenged, this same juggernaut shat-
tered, its central contradictions revealed in its own compromises with the very 
real complexities of American history and politics. The power of the New 
Deal order gave the illusion of permanence, but the political edifice contained 
a web of internal fractures that, when stressed, broke open barely two gener-
ations later. Rather than trying to analyze the decline of a presumed political 
norm, as most scholars implicitly have, the more appropriate task might be to 
recast the New Deal and postwar era as "the long exception" to the nation's pol-
itical traditions. Liberalism would continue indefinitely in its many "protean" 
forms but the version generated by the trauma of Depression and war proved 
both distinct and brittle.6 
Within that broader framework, we would like to emphasize three key 
dimensions in our analysis of American politics: the historic weakness of orga-
nized labor, the burdens of race, and the enduring power of religious faith. Each 
was changed in the breakthroughs of the New Deal era but each also maintained 
often overlooked continuities with the deeper impulses of American history— 
not the least of which was the primacy of business in American life. In trying 
to grapple with the decline of the New Deal order, many historians and political 
scientists have pointed to a host of variables, including racial backlash, the 
decline of unions, stagflation, identity politics, the Southern strategy, deindus-
trialization, and globalization, to name but a handful.7 While each has much 
explanatory power, depending up on the framing of the question, we suggest 
that all of the liberal breakthroughs of the thirties and forties with regard 
to labor, race, and religion remained so deeply conflicted in their original 
formation—grounded as they inevitably were in the contours of the American 
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past—that their public, post-1968 rupture appears, on reflection, to be quite 
understandable, perhaps even axiomatic. 
The themes of labor, race, and religion are bound together by the ideol-
ogy—though not necessarily the reality—of a deep and abiding individualism.8 
Every sentence of Sumner's lecture extolled individualism as the keystone of a 
classical, nineteenth-century liberalism in dire conflict with the emerging admin-
istrative powers of the state enthusiastically supported by reformers and 
nascent, modern liberals. Even Roosevelt, despite being the architect of the 
regulatory state, could not offer a clear alternative to the individualist ethos 
so deeply embedded in America's public culture. So persuasive were FDR's 
evocations of that historic American belief that a trusted advisor, Rexford 
Guy Tugwell, thought that even when Roosevelt tried to construct a new 
vision of individualism suitable for modern, corporate society, those efforts 
"too had not been immune to our national myths [L]ike all of us," Tugwell 
continued, FDR "had a weakness for what was familiar and trusted which led 
him to overestimate their sufficiency and underestimate their irrelevant anti-
quity." Decades later, leaders from Nixon to George W. Bush would continue 
to call upon the same gods of a stark individualism—hardly relegated to anti-
quity as Tugwell presumed—as they avidly sought to govern and even enlarge 
a mammoth bureaucratic entity. While FDR envisioned the Leviathan as the 
"Forgotten Man's" friend and ally, latter-day presidents would continue to 
expand state power by asserting that they promoted his liberty through political 
policies and alliances that William Graham Sumner would have readily 
approved.9 
// 
As Sumner grasped, the most salient feature of the history of American 
working-class politics and union representation has been fragmentation. In 
the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, skilled, native stock, Protestant workers 
tended to be Republican and often carried cards in the craft unions of the old 
AFL. Old Irish and German Catholics might also be in the skilled trades but 
were most likely in the Democratic Party. The new immigrants from Southern 
and Eastern Europe, often unskilled workers, were not only in different political 
parties from their skilled brethren, but their sporadic attempts to build broad-
based industrial unions were sharply opposed by them as well. Black workers 
were not only Republicans, which placed them at political odds with those 
workers closest to them economically, but they also encountered systematic 
exclusion by working-class whites who typically favored their identity of white-
ness over interracial solidarity. If there was one thing uniting the working people 
of both parties, it was their mutual distaste for yet another segment of the 
working class, Chinese immigrant labor. Add to this a host of other political, 
racial, regional, ideological, and ethnic differences and there is less a single 
working-class political identity than there is a splintered series of votes based 
on ethno-political antagonism. Occasionally brilliant flashes of solidarity 
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transcended this political crazy quilt, but this pervasive, layered, fragmentation 
of a collective class identity remained a central fact of American political 
history.10 
Yet in the midst of the Great Depression, workers emerged from their 
separate enclaves into a coalition that drove the single great breakthrough in 
collective working-class politics and organization. It was an extraordinary 
moment, a singular period in US history, in which all the key factors fell into 
place to create the New Deal order. White working people, attracted by an 
increasingly homogeneous culture (their ethnic loyalties no longer reinforced 
yearly after the Immigration Act of 1924 and the exhaustion of ethnic welfare 
resources in the economic crisis) slowly edged beyond the ethnic enclave. The 
reorganization of production over the previous four decades, engineered by 
Frederick Winslow Taylor, Henry Ford, and their associates, also restructured 
group identity, particularly in leveling the distinction between skilled and 
unskilled workers. Simultaneously, the experience of welfare capitalism in the 
twenties, in which employers provided social programs in lieu of union represen-
tation, broadened workers' conception of the rights due them in the wake of that 
system's collapse early in the Depression. Moreover, the depth of the Great 
Depression helped foster a general sense of shared national destiny—that the 
nation's citizens would rise or fall together." 
Two additional transformations occurred in the early years of the New Deal 
that propelled the great breakthrough. New union leadership, committed to 
industrial unionism and aggressive tactics against management, looked to 
organize all, including at times women and African Americans, whose prior 
exclusion had often doomed earlier efforts. Of great significance was the role 
of government. For the first time in American political history, the federal gov-
ernment actively supported the right of working people to organize collectively 
to achieve their goals. The National Labor Relations Act affirmed the right to 
organize and provided rules of conduct for, and oversight of, union elec-
tions—an unprecedented set of legal protections. The Supreme Court even tem-
porarily abandoned a deep history of opposition to the collective interests of 
working people and upheld the Wagner Act in 1937. The commingling of a 
renewed sense of the possible among workers, government support, and a 
revived union leadership produced a rare moment in the long struggle of orga-
nized labor when the unions won—and won big—delivering over one-third of 
the nonagricultural labor force into the union movement by the end of the 
Second World War.12 
Despite this, as historian Nelson Lichtenstein argues, "industrial unionism's 
moment of unrivaled triumph proved exceedingly brief." It was only a matter of 
weeks after the CIO's famous victories at General Motors and US Steel in 1937, 
he notes, that ''the radical challenge posed by mass unions generated furious 
opposition: from corporate adversaries, Southern Bourbons, craft unionists, 
and many elements of the New Deal coalition itself." The passage of the 1938 
Fair Labor Standards Act marked the high point in labor legislation. Even 
then, just when the project to organize mass industry began to falter in the 
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recession and political attacks after 1937, the national mobilization for war alone 
saved the upsurge in union membership. What followed in both politics and 
organizing was largely a consolidation and expansion of those early victories, 
and a series of tactical retreats, if not outright defeats, in attempts to push 
beyond them. As Lichtenstein continues, "the unions would never again enjoy 
a political environment as favorable as that which transformed American 
work life during the years between 1934 and 1937."13 
Even as the profound trauma of the Great Depression fostered new 
approaches, it also revealed sharp continuities with the American past. As 
with the Populist movement before it, in which the individualism of small 
farmers propelled a search for a common good critical of corporate influence, 
the New Deal was limited by the continued appeal of that individualist ethos. 
This entrenched cultural value set the limits on the rise of organized labor, as 
David Brody has argued: "In America, where individual liberty weighed so 
heavily, labor law more than in any other country discounted the claims of soli-
darity in favor of the nonunion workers and, more to the point, the antiunion 
employer."14 
The Depression years marked a fundamental shift in the Democratic 
Party's vision away from the chaotic stream of populist rhetoric, progressive 
pragmatism, antimonopoly politics, and radical flirtations that had defined it 
since the nineteenth century. Although those earlier ideas continued to have 
their adherents, the bedrock legislation of the early New Deal signaled a turn 
away from antimonopoly positions to the acceptance and regulation of the 
modern corporation. By 1937, liberal political commentators and Democratic 
Party leaders alike confined their policy aims to a single set of principles 
intended to regulate capitalism toward increased consumption. As Alan 
Brinkley expressed it, this new "set of liberal ideas essentially reconciled to 
the existing structure of the economy and committed to using the state to com-
pensate for capitalism's inevitable flaws—a philosophy that signaled, implicitly 
at least, a resolution of some of the most divisive political controversies of the 
industrial era." After 1937, the liberals' job was to manage the system toward 
the Keynesian dream of full employment and broad-based consumption. As 
Brinkley concludes, it was "a world in which large-scale bureaucracies were 
becoming ever more dominant and in which it was becoming increasingly diffi-
cult to imagine an alternative to them;" it was a system "more coherent, less 
diverse, and on the whole less challenging to the existing structure of corporate 
capitalism than some of the ideas it supplanted." For all of the press coverage of 
FDR's 1936 campaign condemnation of the nation's "economic royalists" who 
sought, he claimed, to impose an "industrial dictatorship"—a truly exceptional 
rhetorical stance in American presidential oratory—a far more accurate guide 
to the legacy of both FDR and New Deal liberalism remained his 1932 campaign 
call for an "enlightened administration" of the corporate economy orchestrated 
by the state in concert with the business community. The gutted Employment 
Act of 1946 and the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 were early evidence of the 
trimmed prospects of the New Deal for the postwar era.15 
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As important as these economic and trade union issues were in defining the 
limits of the New Deal philosophy, two additional issues reveal the fragility of 
the core of its political coalition. In particular, the unresolved issue of race 
proved detrimental to advancing liberalism beyond its miracle decade 
between 1935 and 1945. With the major migration of southern blacks into the 
North between 1915 and 1945, black voters did move into the New Deal elec-
toral coalition by 1944, and there was a powerful effort by some in the labor 
movement to welcome black workers into their industries and their unions, par-
ticularly those affiliated with the CIO. However, in the union movement as in 
the Roosevelt administration, an inconsistent commitment to equality limited 
the reach of the liberal coalition.16 
The foundation of the New Deal congressional coalition revealed how 
deep the racial fissure was. The administration's legislative strength rested on 
its Faustian pact with the southern Democrats, senators and representatives bap-
tized into, and who rose to success through, a regional Democratic party that 
proudly proclaimed itself as the party of the white man. Southern black 
voters were overwhelmingly disenfranchised, and the resulting one-party 
system guaranteed that the seniority of southern congressmen molded New 
Deal legislation to a significant extent toward their worldview. That perspective, 
which emphasized the maintenance of a low wage, nonunion, and racially stra-
tified work force "free" of Washington's regulation, contributed to a political 
imbroglio that FDR recognized even before taking office but proved powerless 
to overcome. As Lawrence and Cornelia Levine have suggested, upon FDR's 
death in 1945, "the greatest irony" was that the New Deal Democratic coalition 
remained "as inherently unstable and prone to ideological and political stale-
mate as the day Roosevelt became its leader."17 
On the other side of the coalition were the northern Democrats, many 
liberal and formally committed to racial equality and trade unionism. They 
too understood the power southern Democrats wielded and in the fine print 
of such important legislation such as the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the 
National Labor Relations Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act—each of 
which specifically exempted from coverage categories with heavy concen-
trations of black working people—one can find the price demanded for the 
bill's very passage. But racial realities closer to home also constrained many 
of these northern politicians. When FDR issued an executive order implement-
ing fair employment practices in defense industries, in response to A. Philip 
Randolph's proposed protest march on the White House, the reaction of north-
ern white working people—the constituency of many elected Democratic 
politicians—was revealing. As these policies were implemented in Detroit, 
Chicago, Cleveland, and other industrial centers, white workers, many in the 
United Auto Workers (UAW) and other liberal unions, walked off the job 
rather than work with union "brothers" who were black. So pervasive were 
these actions, dubbed "hate strikes," and so committed were the strikers, that 
the national UAW joined forces with the federal government to strip their 
own locals of labor law protections if they persisted. Not even the wartime 
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patriotism of northern white workers could overcome embedded racial atti-
tudes, and most unions did little to alter rank and file thinking.18 
Not surprisingly, given its deep currents in the American past, the issue of 
religion also confronted New Deal liberalism, although not openly until after the 
war. This was perhaps ironic for, in prewar liberal opinion, religion was thought 
at best a private affair without serious public meaning.19 Common wisdom 
among liberals and progressives of all stripes held that the Scopes trial in 
1925, which starred Clarence S. Darrow as the defender of science, evolution, 
and individual rights against fundamentalism's champion of traditional morality 
and majoritarian rule, William Jennings Bryan, had settled once and for all two 
critical, interrelated questions: evolution would be taught in the nation's schools 
and religious faith, mocked into irrelevance by H.L. Mencken's sardonic com-
mentary on the trial, was no longer a factor in modern America. Joel 
Carpenter's study of the fundamentalist movement in the decades after the 
Scopes trial reveals how erroneous this latter perception was: fundamentalists 
were less vanquished than busy building a potent and widespread alternative 
culture that nurtured their faith and would, in time, return in force to the 
public square.20 
In a different way Catholic working people as well veered sharply from 
New Deal-era liberal thought. For generations, American Catholics had 
grown to consciousness within a church tradition that identified liberal individu-
alism and secular modernity as mortal enemies. This was not simply the conse-
quence of an archconservative, authoritarian hierarchy—although church 
leaders at every level tended to be just that; rather, this opposition to liberal-
ism's secular individualism had complex roots in Catholic social teaching. In 
part, a long held corporatist sensibility, which emphasized the centrality of the 
family over the autonomous individual, remained influential and found daily 
expression in the national system of parochial schools for generations of 
Catholic children. For American Catholics, that ethos both encouraged a 
"Catholic ghetto" mentality into the 1950s in response to secular culture and 
a serious social analysis of the political economy which proclaimed social 
responsibility for poverty and other related problems. The very emphasis on 
family opened wide the door to demands for societal solutions to such structural 
inequalities. American Catholicism's leading progressive cleric, Father John 
Ryan, lamented the New Deal's shift to a Keynesian-inspired policy of consu-
mer individualism that offered "new inventions that produced new luxuries" 
in lieu of economic planning that promoted communal well being.21 
This central theme in Catholic social thought would prove critical to 
popular Catholic reaction to the New Deal and to its legacy of liberalism. 
Catholic working people were active within the union movement, comprising 
as much as a third or more of the new industrial unionists, and a significant 
segment of the AFL membership as well. But their embrace of communal sol-
utions to poverty, economic injustice, and inhumane conditions at work or 
home were not commitments held apart from their faith. Justice was embedded 
within that faith-based vision and contained other issues understood as the 
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essential foundation for those social and economic concerns. Opposition to both 
birth control (widely if not universally observed by Catholics into the 1960s) and 
abortion reflected a concern for individual life and the integrity of the family 
inseparable from the call for social justice. Most importantly for political activity, 
the staunch anticommunism of the Catholic community had a pronounced 
impact on New Deal, working-class Catholics. Their faith precluded a ready 
acceptance of the rational-materialist vision of much of the CIO; their focus 
on family raised suspicions of a singular reliance on the state; their European 
ethnic heritage encouraged fear of Soviet intentions over the often mythic, 
and therefore all the more powerful, memories of original homelands; and 
their American patriotism alerted them of the need to defend the nation 
against subversion from within. In a way that particularly confounded many 
liberal and left commentators, these men and women could be deeply 
Catholic, active, even militant, trade unionists, and reject much of secular, 
liberal thought, while they simultaneously supported core economic aspects of 
New Deal policy.22 
The undercurrents of both Catholic and Protestant dissent framed the 
broad cultural context for John Dewey's forward looking 1930 reflections on 
American political values, modernity, and liberalism. In Individualism New 
and Old, Dewey, a major philosopher of modern American liberal thought, 
argued for a reconfigured liberalism, one that proclaimed the centrality of 
democratic debate and decision-making and one that derived its vitality from 
both the collective and individualistic values of a democratic nationalism. 
Obsolete and detrimental in an era of corporate capitalism, Dewey argued, 
was the atomistic individualism of nineteenth-century classical liberalism; but 
detrimental too was the embrace of bureaucratic organization and centralized 
planning implemented by "experts" who largely ruled apart from the people 
whose lives their decisions altered. Beyond problem-solving by educated 
elites versed in the technology of management, Dewey asked, what did liberal-
ism offer? His answer was not comforting: The "lack of secure objects of alle-
giance, without which individuals are lost, is especially striking in the case of 
the liberal." Liberalism had in the past "a definite intellectual creed," he 
remarked, but "Liberalism to-day is hardly more than a temper of mind, 
vaguely called forward-looking, but quite uncertain as to where to look and 
what to look forward to." For a political movement, Dewey considered this a 
tragedy: "For human nature is self-possessed only as it has objects to which it 
can attach itself."23 
Four years later, Dewey returned to this theme distinguishing between reli-
gion, which oppressed humanity, and the religious dimension in human experi-
ence emancipated by scientific inquiry and molded through concerted human 
activity. The "ideals" that are thus generated from, and supported by, "forces 
in nature and society" create an "active relation .. . to which I would give the 
name 'God.'" This elevation of man's mastery over nature as the "secure 
object" of Dewey's search indeed became liberalism's postwar anthem. 
Deeply reflective of the culture's romance with science and technology, it 
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nonetheless proved brittle as a unifying national object of allegiance in the 
coming decades."4 
For all of the political and cultural contradictions of the "old" individual-
ism, it had once connected many Americans to the possibility of a broader col-
lective identity, a path that wove through Jeffersonian self-reliance to a concept 
of citizenship rooted in the social value produced for all by one's individual 
work.25 At its most vibrant—in the abolitionist movement, in Populism, 
Progress ivism, the pre-1920 socialist movement, and the women's 
movements—these dissidents expanded traditions of individualism into connec-
tions, albeit typically brief, to a common good. Dewey was nonetheless right 
when he argued that the "old" individualism had outlived its usefulness in a cor-
porate, consumer-orientated society and economy whose domineering presence 
denied a political role for this ethos of individualism. But that same modern 
social structure also precluded the democratization of that scientific mastery 
over nature Dewey advocated. Even more, Dewey and the liberalism he in 
part influenced never quite grasped that their very espousal of human 
mastery was itself considered blasphemous by a majority of Americans whose 
object of individual and national "allegiance" was in fact "secured" by their 
religious faith. 
The New Dealers' turn away from antimonopoly, the most potent political 
expression of that earlier producer-based individualism, toward a socioeco-
nomic national policy designed to support corporate development and the con-
sumer culture it encouraged, largely eliminated the possibility of the "old" 
individualism transforming itself into a new fighting liberal faith. As liberals dis-
missed most redistributive policies that significantly curtailed corporate prero-
gatives, the potent connection that had once tied the individual to a 
communal vision sharply ebbed. Without that bridge to common ground, liber-
als' continued evocation of individualism encouraged instead a more familiar, 
private understanding, one focused on the assertion of individual rights and lib-
erties in conflict with the majoritarian ethos formerly evoked by William 
Jennings Bryan and others. The consequences, we suggest, were profound. 
Shorn as it was of a redistributive vision and lacking those "secure objects of 
allegiance," the New Deal proved to be a weak philosophical alternative to 
the dominant strain of individualism in the public arena. It would be only a 
matter of time before liberalism's more conservative opponents, like Sumner 
himself, artfully, and to a surprising degree, successfully, presented the political 
arena as a renewed American battle between the people and the liberal elite. 
/// 
To identify these many stress fractures in the very foundation of the New Deal 
order is not to dismiss its immense accomplishments. Many historians and fru-
strated activists, especially those who formed their opinions in the 1970s and 
1980s, have been critical of labor's more bureaucratic form during and after 
the Second World War. Given the very real obstacles to grander schemes, the 
Rethinking the Place of the New Deal in American History 13 
war and postwar eras are best seen as periods of working-class achievement 
rather than compromise and sellout, a period in which the wartime emergency 
allowed the unions to gain much of what they were unable to obtain during the 
thirties. Labor may have rapidly waned as a social insurgency, but the presence 
and power of unions in the postwar era stood as institutional proof of the far 
reaching, if simple, idea that common people were entitled to a decent life. 
Unions checked the unlimited prerogatives of business and, with the passing 
of each bargaining session and each strike, delivered unprecedented affluence 
for working people. In the process economic inequality declined, wages and 
benefits rose, and nonunion working people received important spillover 
effects. As conservative as the choices may have been from the options avail-
able, to have social security, a minimum wage, relief programs, and extensive 
job creation were significant events in individual and familial experience. 
Steelworker's son Jack Metzgar, for instance, could point to a complete 
transformation in his family's fortunes after the Second World War—from 
their material well-being to his father's bearing toward supervisors on the 
shop floor. "No regular guy in the history of the world had seen the material con-
ditions of his life improve more dramatically," he noted about the coming of the 
CIO to the steel mills. Yet that new material wealth was also more than just that; 
it was a source of expansive possibility. The "moral injunctions to daily fortitude 
made so much more sense than when there were so many visible payoffs for 
doing so," explained Metzgar. "We were learning to tolerate less and less repres-
sion from anybody or anything... . If what we lived through in the 1950s was not 
liberation, then liberation never happens in real human lives." That Metzgar 
quite realistically framed his family's "liberation" as a product of home owner-
ship, a new world of consumer durables, and the lilting sense of hope built upon 
rising expectations—buoyed by the cycle of social Keynesianism fostered by col-
lective bargaining—is both honest and profoundly suggestive of the outer 
reaches of American working-class politics.26 
Just as the Second World War saved the CIO from its late-thirties' dol-
drums, so too the war, more than the New Deal itself, created the more equi-
table economy enjoyed by the Metzgar family. The major reallocation of the 
American division of wealth was, in fact, not the New Deal but the Second 
World War. Economists Thomas Pidetty and Emmanuel Saez have shown 
that "the twentieth century decline in inequality took place in a very specific 
and brief time interval" fostered by the large tax increases necessary to fund 
the war.27 Prior to 1940 economic power had been consistently concentrated 
in the top percentiles until what other economists have called the "Great 
Compression" in the American wage structure that occurred during the war.28 
The "surprising fact," Claudia Golden and Robert Margo argue, is that "top 
wage shares did not recover after the war." Why the wealthiest were not able 
to recoup their historic percentage of the pie in the immediate postwar era 
can be attributed to the New Deal policies that, in maintaining the pattern of 
redistribution that had been created during the wartime emergency, shared 
more widely the benefits of a booming economy. These maintenance policies 
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(which are often mistakenly considered "redistributive") were the real foun-
dation of the postwar promise of a "golden age." This period of rough equity 
allowed the bottom sixty percent of households to more than double their 
pretax income between 1949 and 1979. The pattern began to reverse course 
in the 1970s and, within a decade, the nation's wealthiest citizens returned to 
their accustomed, commanding positions of power, unencumbered by significant 
countervailing forces in either political or economic realms.29 
Important as the more expansive terrain of economic opportunity of the 
postwar era was, however, it did not liberate Americans from the historic con-
straints of their political culture. Indeed, the inherent limits that framed the 
New Deal were shared both by liberal elites and, to a significant degree, by a 
majority of working people as well. Union leaders, for example, with impressive 
rank and file support, staked their legacy not on racial justice, equal pay. quality of 
work life, or even on expansion of the movement beyond the white, male, indus-
trial sectors. Rather, what proved most attractive was the welcome security the 
New Deal offered: the rising wages that encouraged consumption and the legal 
and economic policies that promised secure, continuous employment. Workers 
and the union leadership, with significant governmental support, were the 
bulwark against the unlimited prerogatives of business. Simultaneously, they 
largely embraced rather than contested the emerging new order.30 
In the fifteen years following the Second World War, the return to "normal-
ity" and a booming domestic economy appeared to be confirmation that the new 
system worked. The Cold War certainly raised tensions within liberalism, and 
between liberalism and a conservative politics less dormant than before, but it 
actually enhanced the New Deal order's political strength.31 In fact, what was 
most impressive was the cohesive nationalism that formed public attitudes on 
this issue. Labor, too, seemed ensconced, an institutional given of the new pol-
itical order, and a staunch ally in a national anticommunist crusade. The 1955 
merger of the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations healed internal wounds; and that same year union membership 
approached thirty-five percent of all wage earners, the highest ever to that 
date or since. Despite the growing prominence of evangelical revivalists like 
Billy Graham and the reappearance of morally engaged, grassroots conservative 
activists, the religious presence in American political life remained comfortably 
in the cultured hands of the mainline liberal Protestants. Even on racial issues, 
America's ever-present reality, improvements appeared evident to many liberal 
Americans. White workers accommodated to the presence of blacks on the 
assembly line, if not yet in skilled positions, even as fierce territorial battles 
over black residential expansion continued in northern cities.32 
While liberal intellectuals began to talk of the "'end of ideology," of how the 
postwar system had ended class conflict by creating industrial pluralism, and 
how the unions were now simply junior partners to the corporations in the 
modern state's regulatory bureaucracy, other forces were already in motion.33 
On the left, the rising social movements of the sixties tended to see liberalism 
and labor at first as an ambivalent ally, "its social idealism waning under the 
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tendencies of bureaucracy, materialism, business ethics," in the words of the 
New Left's 1962 "Port Huron Statement."34 By the latter half of the sixties, 
both liberals and the unions grew to become the left's opponents—too bureau-
cratized, too slow on civil rights, too retrograde on women's issues, and, above 
all, among the staunchest supporters of the war in Vietnam. From the right, 
a deep distrust of liberalism, including its "modern Republican" variant, was 
also evident, as what began as an intellectual critique of the New Deal's "'enligh-
tened administration" broadened into a popular movement. William F. 
Buckley's National Review helped move conservatism away from a "stuffy 
orthodoxy, Republican stand-pat-ism and economic self-interest" by offering 
what Pat Buchanan called a "snapping pennant" of political faith that played 
a critical role in encouraging a variety of contentious conservative thinkers to 
reach ever more receptive audiences with a new vision. Increasingly, in southern 
California, across the South, and in many Midwestern communities, conserva-
tism turned more populist, demanding the inclusion of the phrase, "under 
God," in the Pledge of Allegiance and the passage of antiunion "right-to 
work" legislation in state after state, while fiercely opposing government-
sponsored sex education and the abolition of prayer in the nation's public 
schools.35 
By the early 1960s, a conservative movement had emerged, complete with 
its own youth wing, Young Americans for Freedom, and with two major 
achievements to its credit. It offered a potent critique of liberalism with 
appeals to Dewey's "old" individualism and to anticommunism, two core 
objects of an American allegiance, and did so in concert with the slowly awaken-
ing religious communities long thought by liberal activists to have disintegrated. 
Second, while the New Left's critique of liberalism dismissed its ideas and its 
institutions (particularly the Democratic Party and its major ally, organized 
labor) as equally corrupt, the conservatives scathingly critiqued the liberal 
Republicans who then dominated the GOP even as they worked consistently 
and effectively to commandeer that national party. The different approaches 
proved critical. Barry Goldwater lost the 1964 election to Lyndon Baines 
Johnson and, as liberals crowed over the demise of a candidate and his move-
ment that the historian Richard Hofstadter scorned as "so bizarre, so archaic, 
so self-confounding, so remote from the basic American consensus," conserva-
tives planned for the future. Goldwater's more than 26 million voters were a 
quite respectable base for future political organizing. In Ronald Reagan, an 
experienced conservative—and once a New Deal enthusiast—the movement 
found its spokesman and, in 1966, a successful California gubernatorial candi-
date. Liberal exaltation at Goldwater's defeat proved in but a few years to be 
as astute as an earlier liberal generation's complacent reaction to the Scopes 
trial.36 
As much as there was an exception that proves the rule of the "long excep-
tion," it was another brief but intense period of reform between 1964 and 1965. 
Politically, the Great Society was an unexpected byproduct of the political 
capital gained after the assassination of John F Kennedy, the subsequent breaking 
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of the legislative log jam formed by Southern Democrats and Northern 
Republicans, and Lyndon B. Johnson's landslide victory over Barry Goldwater. 
Like the inchoate phiJosophy of the New Deal, Johnson's most direct attack on 
inequality, the "war on poverty," was a hodgepodge of programs glued together 
by a single phrase. Unlike the New Deal's focus on creating jobs directly, 
however, the "war on poverty" programs emphasized helping individuals to 
reform themselves so as to gain better access to the job market—mostly 
through job training and educational assistance. 
The tacit assumption of Great Society policymakers was that in the midst of 
the greatest economic boom in American history, unemployment was not a 
structural problem but a personal one. Johnson made this pointedly clear 
during his administration's first months. He declared an "unconditional war 
on poverty in America" in his January 1964 State of the Union speech and, 
on February 1, appointed Sargent Shriver, then the director of the Peace 
Corps, to head the effort. But in a cabinet meeting a few weeks later, when 
Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz suggested a massive jobs program similar to 
the New Deal's Works Progress Administration, Johnson's menacing glare fore-
closed any movement in that direction: "I have never seen a colder reception 
from the president," a staff member at that meeting recalled. Johnson "just— 
absolute blank stare—implied without even opening his mouth that Shriver 
should move onto the next proposal." Neither a jobs program nor direct 
relief, both echoes of a New Deal past, were on LBJ's agenda. Rather, his 
goal remained to make of the poor "tax payers rather than tax eaters."37 The 
declarations of "unconditional war," moreover, had always been grander than 
the actual funding. As Daniel Patrick Moynihan explained at the time, the 
"war" had been "oversold and under financed to the point that its failure was 
almost a matter of design." No sooner had the political dam broke in 
1964-1965, then it began to re-form, blocking future liberal advances, while at 
the same time Johnson diverted the dollars he originally intended for his dom-
estic war to the war in Vietnam.38 
Johnson envisioned his Great Society programs as "fulfilling FDR's 
mission," but the core focus of those varied legislative acts differed sharply 
from Roosevelt's. In his May 1964 speech, Johnson proclaimed that the century-
long effort "to create an order of plenty for all of our people" had been success-
ful. The current task, down into the coming century, would be "to use that 
wealth to enrich and elevate our national life, and to advance the quality of 
our American civilization." This was the moment for the nation to dedicate 
itself to reach beyond the "rich ... and the powerful society . . . upward 
toward the Great Society," that place "where men are more concerned with 
the quality of their goals than the quantity of their goods." This post-materialist 
appeal was quite different from Roosevelt's, but it did result in an avalanche of 
social and cultural improvements aimed at a general uplifting of the nation. The 
creation of the Transportation Department; educations bills, with their Pell 
grants and student loans; consumer protection acts; the creation of the Public 
Broadcasting System; the national endowments for both the Humanities and 
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the Arts; the core national environmental acts: and the beautification of the 
nation's highways did in fact greatly enhance American life. No Great Society 
innovation proved more popular than Head Start, which focused on the 
education of the nation's poor children. All of these programs would be 
attacked directly over the years, but as Robert Dallek has observed, their con-
tinued survival, and the broader spirit that motivated them, owes much to their 
"hold on the public imagination that endures."39 
Of the flood of liberal legislation that crossed Johnson's desk prior to the 
conservative turn of the 1966 midterm elections, none were more important 
than the creation of Medicare (for the aged) and Medicaid (for the poor) in 
1965. National health insurance had been on the progressive docket since the 
New Deal era, but even at the apex of liberals' postwar power, Johnson felt 
he did not have the votes to initiate a comprehensive national program of 
health insurance. By tactically choosing to provide protection to the poor and 
aged, the Great Society did help close some of the largest gaps in the semipri-
vate welfare system created after the Second World War. Many Great Society 
policy makers presumed, in this era of liberal consensus, that the main sectors 
of the economy would remain unionized indefinitely and medical benefits 
would only need to be provided for those outside of the well-organized and well-
remunerated primary sectors of the economy. In reality, the semiprivate, con-
tractual welfare arrangements were, as Jennifer Klein put it, only "islands of 
security, with high waters all around."40 Within two decades, vast swaths of 
wage earners would qualify neither for employer-provided health insurance 
nor the federal programs, and medical benefits provided by a union contract 
would become an increasingly rare thing for working Americans.41 The Great 
Society was built on the premise that the New Deal generation had solved the 
major structural issues. Those premises, however, were losing both their econ-
omic and political validity, leaving the founding arguments of the Great 
Society greatly weakened. 
Central to these developments was the impact of the Civil Rights move-
ment. An eloquent and morally compelling grassroots demand for the extension 
of citizenship to all individual Americans clashed with the structural limitations 
of New Deal liberalism. The ensuing public religious framing of demands for 
citizenship and political rights was often dismissed as extraneous, even a camou-
flage, to a decidedly secular, progressive liberal social movement. That too it 
was, but the force of that African American faith in debates over numerous 
social issues in the coming decades would create tensions both within black com-
munities and with their liberal allies.42 The career of Martin Luther King, Jr. also 
revealed these boundaries. As long as he and the movement remained within 
the individualist emphasis on citizenship and the American tradition, King 
remained an icon for liberals, North and South. But as he expanded his focus, 
integrating issues of poverty, military expenditures, and the morality of the 
Vietnam War, proudly claiming the antiwar socialist Eugene V. Debs as an influ-
ence, many mainstream white liberals began to question and criticize. That 
others in the movement, reacting as did King to the welcome but still limited 
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achievement of individual political rights, raised the slogan of black power made 
the dismissal of King's new approach that much easier.43 
In a way that some still found counterintuitive, however, many of the most 
violent confrontations between blacks and whites occurred not in the South but 
in northern cities. Early in the 1960s, before the passage of the Civil Rights Act 
in 1964 and the Voting Rights Act the following year, white trade unionists (par-
ticularly in the skilled building trades) often found themselves the object of 
picket lines and sit-ins for maintaining all-white applicant lists for the required 
apprentice training programs. Their angry responses, sympathetically shared by 
many other union workers, were in part racially driven, but it was also a defen-
sive reaction to a perceived economic threat. Organized workers, usually white 
and male, had achieved some extraordinary victories in negotiations with 
employers over the past decades and enjoyed the benefits of a semiprivate 
welfare system. Nonunion workers, either excluded from existing unions or in 
the burgeoning unorganized sectors of the economy—often women and 
people of color in service occupations—were left out of the club. Even more 
explosive were the efforts by the Civil Rights movement to expand housing 
options for blacks in Chicago, Detroit, and other northern cities. So violent 
was the opposition in Chicago in the summer of 1966 that King declared: 
"I have never in my life seen such hatred. Not in Mississippi or Alabama. 
This is a terrible thing."44 
Many white workers, conscious of protecting the unique gains achieved 
through contractual agreements, furiously resisted what they perceived as 
unwarranted attacks on their economic standing and neighborhood bound-
aries. They felt they were becoming the new forgotten men, a sentiment 
reinforced by the political drumbeat of Governor George Wallace on the 
Right and demands for affirmative action on the Left. As school busing 
moved to the forefront in northern cities after 1966, managed and enforced 
by federal courts, that anger exploded. In the fallout, a significant number of 
northern working people, organized or not, gravitated toward more conserva-
tive political candidates, and sharply toward Republicans in presidential 
contests. Many union workers and their leaders believed that their one-time 
success during the thirties and forties had turned the house of labor into a 
palace. And perhaps it had, but the entrance was heavily guarded and the 
foundation lay on shifting sands.45 
During this decade as well, another major pillar of that 1930s coalition also 
sharply altered direction. Southern Democrats, generally conservative, were fast 
changing their registration and voting Republican, driven by resistance to civil 
rights gains, federal enforcement of the Constitution, and a growing concern 
with the moral culture of American life. In one of the important—and 
ironic—realignments in American political life, new Southern suburban 
Republicans joined to support a Richard Nixon and ultimately a Ronald 
Reagan in alliance with white working people in the North whose economic 
interests Southern politicians had so consistently and effectively blocked for 
a generation. Figures such as Wallace and South Carolina Senator Strom 
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Thurmond symbolized the nation's evolving political affiliations. Thurmond, 
who began his career as a states' rights Democrat bolted the party in 1948 to 
run as a Dixiecrat against Harry Truman and the Roosevelt legacy. Then, in 
1964, Thurmond completed his rightward journey, when he announced as a 
Republican and campaigned intensely for Barry Goldwater throughout the 
South. As Kevin Phillips suggested, the legions of forgotten men among the 
Wallace voters—both north and south—were likewise en route from a 
Democratic past to a Republican future.46 
IV 
Many of the transitions in the late postwar era were embodied on the presiden-
tial level in the figure of Richard Nixon. Cambodia and Watergate rightfully 
overshadow his presidency, but if we take Nixon on his own terms, then his over-
arching political goal was to build the successor to the Roosevelt coalition— 
what he liked to call the New Majority. He believed that his 1972 landslide elec-
toral victory was for the Republicans much like the 1936 election was for 
Roosevelt and the Democrats: the delivery of the common man to the party 
of Nixon. Although not ready to abandon workers to the free market—in fact 
still very much governing in a liberal mode—his strategy was to shift the electo-
rate's allegiances from the shared material world of the New Deal to the div-
isions of culture, social life, and race. As he lectured his advisors about the 
new world of the 1970s, "The real issues of the election are the ones like patri-
otism, morality, religion—not the material issues. If the issues were prices and 
taxes, they'd vote for McGovern."47 
Writing in the brief halcyon days between Nixon's victory and the Watergate 
disaster, presidential advisor Patrick Buchanan claimed that "the ideological fault 
that runs beneath the surface and down the center of the Democratic Party is as 
deep as any political division in America." The blue collar, lower middle class 
ethnics and white Southerners "who gave FDR those great landslides" are now 
in rebellion against the "intellectual aristocracy and liberal elite who now set 
the course of their party." Although Nixon's electoral victory and the triumphant 
rhetoric came as the administration was about to crumble under the Watergate 
scandal, Buchanan was only off the mark by the degree and timing, though not 
the substance, of his point when he claimed that 1972 "makes the long-predicted 
'realignment of parties' a possibility, and could make Mr. Nixon the Republican 
FDR" and the New Right "the successor to the Roosevelt coalition."48 Yet Nixon 
and his advisors took too much credit for their accomplishment. As Thomas 
Sugrue argues, the deeper impulses of American history had long been at 
work. "The 'silent majority' did not emerge de novo from the alleged failures 
of liberalism in the 1960s; it was not the unique product of white rejection of 
the Great Society. Instead it was the culmination of more than two decades of 
simmering white discontent and extensive antiliberal political organization."49 
In the aftermath of Richard Nixon's defeat of George McGovern in 1972, 
Democratic Senator Eugene McCarthy pinpointed the converse of Nixon's 
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perceived victory: that the Democrats had long been coasting on their old 
accomplishments. His party, lamented McCarthy, had not offered any real differ-
ences on major issues of collective welfare between themselves and the opposi-
tion since 1948. Rather, Democrats had pursued office in the postwar era "trying 
to get elected on the basis of our old achievements, running on the New Deal, 
what we did in the 1930s." We "were also running on the old failure of the 
Republicans," he concluded, reduced to digging up the corpse of Herbert 
Hoover to rattle voters' fears.50 
Before liberals were able to recover from the 1972 electoral disaster and 
enjoy their post-Watergate victories in the 1974 midterms, a crumbling 
economy destroyed their last claim to leadership. The year 1972 had been the 
most egalitarian year in US history, the point on the graph where society's 
largess was shared most equitably; unemployment was at historic lows, and earn-
ings were at their all time high for male wage earners, having climbed an aston-
ishing forty percent since 1960. Beginning in 1973-1974, however, the impact of 
the New Deal eroded. Real earnings first stagnated, advances driven down by 
oil shocks and inflation, and then by deindustrialization, plant closings, and a 
global restructuring of work itself that would continue over the ensuing three 
decades. Neither the policies nor the political coalitions that had maintained 
the Second World War era "great compression" proved tenable in the waning 
days of the long exception. To the present day, earnings for working people 
have continued to languish, rarely rising above the high achieved in the early 
1970s. In 2005, measures of inequality had returned to 1920s levels. Even the 
relative rise of women's wages in the 1980s is greatly attributable to the 
decline in male earnings.51 
In the face of the stern economic challenges of the seventies, the 
absence of a viable collective vision that had briefly animated New Deal 
liberal policy left few alternatives, while the rising politics of individual 
rights proved a weak set of protections against the perfect economic 
storm of the seventies. Despite the collective-sounding left rhetoric that 
often accompanied demands in the post-1965 civil rights and feminist move-
ments, at the core of these and many other actions was a concern with 
expanding the rights and freedoms of individuals and social—but not econ-
omic—groups. The result would eventually be called "rights consciousness" 
or "identity politics," a political outlook that contrasted with the economic 
liberalism of the New Deal. Although the distinction between the two 
eras is often overdrawn, the new outlook emphasized the rights of pre-
viously excluded individuals and groups to equal opportunity. The contrast 
was most pronounced in labor and employment law, where the old system 
of labor rights was "fading away," legal scholar Katherine Stone explained, 
overtaken by "a plethora of new employment rights for individual workers" 
that promised protection from issues such as discrimination and sexual har-
assment. A parallel process, with even wider reverberations across 
American life, marked the feminist movement and the profound changes 
in gender relations in post-sixties' America. Economic demands—equal 
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pay for equal work—achieved enormous attention and considerable success 
in the decades after 1970 but, at its foundation, was built upon the individ-
ual right of each woman. The movements for gender equality fundamentally 
transformed occupational life, but the underlying rationale was consistent 
with that "old" individualism Dewey had lamented and could be perfectly 
aligned with enlightened corporate policy (not to mention an economy 
that increasingly relied upon families with two breadwinners). There was 
no fundamental contradiction in the fact that a political demand that 
originated in a rhetorically left-leaning movement but embedded its politics 
in an individualist vision would find its most effective applications within 
major corporations." 
The new politics offered a more progressive version of individualism— 
often based on the rights of previously excluded groups—as well as a telling cri-
tique of the whiteness and maleness of the New Deal paradigm. Although blame 
for the decline of New Deal liberalism is often laid on the table of post-sixties 
"rights consciousness," the draw of individual and group rights over collective 
material well being actually speaks to more profound issues: the historical fragi-
lity of class identity in American politics, the exceptional nature of the New Deal 
order, and the powerful allure of individual rights in American culture. By the 
time that stagflation, the second greatest set of economic problems of the twen-
tieth century, befuddled policymakers, the New Deal was largely exhausted and 
the new politics offered few answers to the structural crisis of the seventies. 
Old-school liberals tried to overcome the divisiveness of post-sixties America 
by rebuilding a New Deal vision on a shared material platform that included 
labor law reform, full employment legislation, discussions over industrial 
policy, and debates over national health insurance. All of these efforts were 
still born. They scratched their heads as the "presumed Weberian distinction 
between the rational economic realm and the irrational social realm" broke 
down into far more complicated axes of political and social identity. Those 
dimensions of political identity with the most traction for those on both the 
right and the left proved to be far from the workplace.53 
The pre-New Deal system of employee relations once dismissed as 
"welfare capitalism" returned to fill the breach. In lieu of the fading power of 
trade unions and the declining efficacy of the regulatory state, working people 
drifted back toward a corporate paternalism that reinforced employees' depen-
dence upon the "largesse" of the private sector. Generations of analysts have 
typically believed that this limited system of worker benefits offered by employ-
ers in exchange for loyalty to the corporation of the 1920s broke down of its own 
accord with inevitable rise of the welfare state and the modern union movement. 
But, as David Brody argues, "It is comforting to think that welfare capitalism 
never was a success, never persuaded workingmen that they were best off as 
wards of the employer, and never took deep roots in the American industrial 
order. The facts, however suggest otherwise." Had it not been for the economic, 
and thus political, trauma of the thirties, the course of corporate paternalism 
might well have continued uninterrupted as the main current of American 
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industrial relations even in the postwar era. Sanford Jacoby builds on this, 
showing the enduring but overlooked legacy of welfare capitalism even at the 
height of the New Deal's powers and certainly long after their decline.54 
The ensuing culture wars furthered the erosion of a collective economic 
vision. Advocates of a pro-choice position on abortion rights, shunning an elec-
toral strategy, joined supporters of busing, affirmative action, and equal employ-
ment opportunity by leaning on the courts, which, for the new "forgotten 
Americans," smacked of a certain distrust of the majority's religiously-informed 
attitudes. In one respect, liberalism was now back in the dawn of its modern 
twentieth-century roots, battling against William Jennings Bryan's evocation 
of community rule. This time, however, the forces of evangelical conservatism, 
widely, if differently, shared across the society, were the harbingers of the future. 
As the New Right's media guru Richard Viguerie noted about the seventies, 
"We never really won until we began stressing issues like busing, abortion, 
school prayer and gun control. We talked about the sanctity of free enterprise, 
about the Communist onslaught until we were blue in face. But we didn't start 
winning majorities in elections until we got down to gut level issues."55 
The 1960s countercultural challenge to American norms met a parallel fate. 
The cultural left often melted into some of the nation's most vaunted mainstream 
traits: consumption, religious revivalism, and antistatism. The Dionysian outlook 
readily melded with materialism and libertarianism, while America's consumer 
culture easily absorbed the sixties' more commercially viable trends. The move-
ment's famous search for authenticity and individual meaning had its most 
lasting institutional impact on American life less in the legacy of the countercul-
ture's multiple experiments with communal living than in the potent individualism 
of Protestant revival evident in the enormous growth of the "New Paradigm," non-
denominational evangelical churches started in the late 1960s by converts from the 
hippie movement, the so-called Jesus people. As Michael Harrington lamented as 
early as 1973, "The cultural revolution has been subverted by the conservative 
society in which it is taking place."56 
In this atmosphere, a struggle to define the meanings of individual rights 
commanded the dominant position in the public political discourse of both 
right and left. Conservatives, riding the wave of a grassroots movement that 
would bring Ronald Reagan to the White House, effectively pitted the rights 
of the forgotten man and woman against the controlling powers of the state 
bureaucracy and the courts. Liberals, too, built upon the success of the 
1960s in expanding individual rights, just as they were simultaneously reduced 
to defending rather than advancing the political and economic gains of the 
1930s and 1940s. The slogans of the day suggest the new political battlefields: 
"right to choose," "right to life," "gay rights," "Equal Rights Amendment," 
"prayer in schools," "right to work," "welfare rights," "consumer rights," and 
even white ethnics' claims to individual rights through group identity. The 
rights discourse became "the near-invincible trump card in most debates regard-
ing public policy." The specific applications of this renewed rights ideology 
served contradictory purposes. For liberals, it marked their growing distance 
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from New Deal visions while simultaneously drawing them into the deepest 
currents in American history.57 
There were some exceptions. The environmental movement grew signifi-
cantly following the first Earth Day in 1970. In environmentalists' efforts to pre-
serve the broadest common ground, the planet itself, a diverse and energetic 
network of activists grew and became a factor in American political culture. 
Environmentalists had significant success in building upon the Great Society's 
Clean Water and Clean Air Acts to preserve that common good, but continued 
to battle against the revival of conservative arguments, rooted in free market 
thought, that decried the regulatory curtailment of corporate prerogatives. 
Other social movements with collective goals ranging from saving manufactur-
ing from the scourge of deindustrialization, to stopping American intervention 
in Central America, to blocking nuclear proliferation, offered up visions that 
reached beyond individual rights and self interest. The outcomes often over-
whelmed the intentions. 
As the 1970s turned into the 1980s and beyond, many New Deal liberals 
sensed that something terrible had gone wrong. In retrospect, one can see 
how liberals reached an impasse, proffering up program after program to deal 
with social ills. This "thinking like a state," in the words of James Scott, was 
the only thing close to Dewey's "secure object of allegiance" available to 
postwar liberals. The labor movement, long the institutional pillar of liberalism, 
had begun its precipitous decline, nearly wiping out the organizing advances of 
the CIO four decades earlier. In post-Nixon America, the corporations suc-
ceeded in their own counter-reformation of capitalism. This time, however, cor-
porations were less dependent upon state-led redistribution to boost demand 
than on a global market for cheap labor and an avidly consuming professional 
middle class. Little wonder then, given this reorganization of the political 
economy, that a socially progressive, and intensely pragmatic young Southern 
governor rose to support another Southerner, incumbent president Jimmy 
Carter, at the 1980 Democratic convention with words rarely if ever heard in 
such a setting before that moment. The electorate "cannot be moved by the 
symbols and accomplishments of the Democratic Party of the past," the 
thirty-four-year-old Bill Clinton declared, and continued: 
We were brought up to believe, uncritically, without thinking about it, that our 
system broke down in the Great Depression, was reconstructed by Franklin 
Roosevelt through the New Deal and World War II, and would never break 
again.... [But] we must remember that we have no right to expect that this or 
any system will be permanently prosperous, free of all crises We did not get 
into these difficulties overnight, and we will not emerge from them immediately. 
It is not in the cards.58 
A decade later this stream of logic would culminate with the rhetorical flourish, 
"the era of big government is over," albeit, one might add, over only for the for-
gotten Americans, not for the corporations.59 
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V 
Given the intense brevity of the "fragile juggernaut," it might be more accurate 
to think of the "Reagan revolution" as the "Reagan restoration," a return to a 
more sharply conservative, individualistic reading of constitutional rights and 
liberties prevalent before the New Deal. That this restoration included a 
society more sharply stratified by economic distinctions and racial divides, a sig-
nificantly less liberal interpretation of a host of social and cultural issues, an 
enhanced fragmentation of working people's political voice, and a reuniting of 
religious and conservative activists in civic life is due to many factors. But pro-
minent among them in driving this return to a new Gilded Age was the profound 
fragility of New Deal liberalism itself. Even so, this was not a restoration in the 
sense of a return to small government as Reagan so forcefully advertised. As 
David Stockman's lament about the Reagan administration's inability to truly 
roll back government suggests, a Hamiltonian structure—contra Louis 
Hartz—was the true vital center of twentieth century American politics. Akin 
to post-Civil War America, the political discourse of the Reagan Era celebrated 
the self-made man while denigrating the encroaching powers of government— 
all the while enlarging those federal powers to new heights. The issue was never 
really whether that government was large or small as political rhetoric might 
have us believe, but toward what ends and whose interest those massive insti-
tutions would be driven.60 
The revival of individualism since the decline of the New Deal order devel-
oped in a radically expanded and much healthier form. The promise of consti-
tutional rights and liberties has been made much wider and more substantial 
by the social movements of the twentieth century: there are no segregationist 
state constitutions, a commitment to gender equality is far broader, and the offi-
cial forms of Jim Crow are in their grave. The Civil Rights Act and the Voting 
Rights Act are the most important political achievements of the postwar era, 
and the transformation in gender relations is the most significant social trans-
formation of the contemporary age. The current—and perhaps exhausted— 
debate between "class politics" and "identity politics" overlooks the fragility 
of the one-time leap forward in class identity and how readily a reformed indi-
vidualism adapted to the deeper impulses in American life. Above all else, any 
understanding of post-New-Deal-order individualism must place at the center 
of the discussion the problems involved with the restoration of the 
nearly-uncontestable power of the fictitious, if legally protected, individual in 
American life: the corporation.61 
It is all too common to see in this the vacillating "cycles" of partisan history 
rather than a "long exception." Undoubtedly, Republican hegemony, like that of 
the Democrats after the Second World War, will inevitably collapse of its own 
weight, in-fighting, decadence, contradictions, corruption, and imperial over-
reach. What replaces it, however, will not be some simple cycle back to a 
New Deal revival but will most likely be a much more chastened form of liberal-
ism that takes its cues from well outside of the New Deal paradigm. Union 
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activists succeed, when they do, by using tactics that stay far away from the once-
promising mechanisms of the National Labor Relations Act. Similarly, 
Democrats wring their hands over their rational-secular reputations by 
seeking to infuse their campaigns with both Southern-ness and spiritual 
vision. Hopes of decent pay for the working poor turn away from Congress 
and toward local living-wage coalitions, and some of the best hopes for health-
care reform remain on the state level. The representation of workers has 
returned to the immigrant ethnic enclave, the church, the workers' center, 
and the occasional union, whose collective strength in the private sector is sig-
nificantly lower now than in the pre-New Deal era.62 
It well may be that the exceptional nature of this era, with all its 
inherent and largely unresolved contradictions, lasted as long as it did as a 
result of several interrelated, structural conditions that were not generated 
directly by the political dynamics of the New Deal. The absence of 
massive immigration between the Immigration Restriction Act of 1924 and 
the reopening of America's borders in 1965 suspended some of the working-
class fragmentation and quickened the process of assimilation of ethnic com-
munities, most importantly in the political arena. The evangelical community 
remained largely outside of politics, thereby muting a major chord in 
American political culture. Even one of the centerpieces of American poli-
tics, populism, also appears to have entered a hiatus between Father 
Charles Coughlin and George Wallace, its impulses instead absorbed by 
the technocratic outlets of collective bargaining, New Deal politics, and 
Keynesian economics. The global framework was also unique, structured 
around a pronounced Cold War unity shaped by an economic context of 
clear American superiority in a stable industrial world. In contrast to the 
eras before the First World War and after the 1970s, a "'de-globalization" 
of the world economy structured the New Deal and the ensuing decades, 
channeling profits and productivity gains into domestic reinvestment to the 
benefits of working Americans.6'" 
To reframe the New Deal order as a long exception, we would argue, is not 
a jaundiced view of American history but a more thorough understanding of our 
recent past that can provide a more stable intellectual foundation on which to 
build discussions of present and future politics. We recognize the contested 
nature of American politics and social life that have informed a wide variety 
of dissenting movements, but we also understand that the most powerful 
aspects of American political culture have proved resistant to these protests. 
Our aim is not to diminish the vision of those dissenters, but rather to resituate 
the New Deal era in the broader terrain of US history. In arguing that there is 
more continuity in American political culture between William Graham Sumner 
and Richard Nixon, we are clearly positing that, absent major national shocks, 
the capacity for fundamental political change is limited in the American 
context. Our founding mythos of individualism has structured our collective 
life, created much of value, and become so intimately intertwined with the 
very essence of the nation itself that its limitations become most difficult to 
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perceive and discuss. If our argument is correct, then conservative victories are 
more understandable and progressive victories all the more astonishing. 
Recognizing the "long exception" allows us to look beyond the static pol-
itical solutions that emerged in the uniquely traumatic circumstances of the 
Roosevelt years and begin to consider what Barrington Moore has called "sup-
pressed historical alternatives" that might (re)imagine contemporary bridges 
between the individualist strains in our public culture and a vision of the 
common good.64 Modern day reformers, for instance, might find more potent 
historical analogies for contemporary dilemmas in the fluid alliances of the 
Progressive Era rather than in the administration of Franklin Roosevelt. 
Indeed, the virtues of that historical movement may actually be in what some 
note as its flaws: an often pragmatic approach to reform, a diffuse leadership, 
mixed class alliances, and the lack of a clear left and right dichotomy. As we 
have suggested, class identification in America has been largely fragmented, 
influenced by deeper currents in the culture than just the economic. 
In Michael Kazin's words, Americans tend to see themselves as "a people not 
a class," suggesting that a real and fruitful politics must be based on those long-
standing realities rather than a desire for it to be otherwise.65 At their best, the 
progressive reformers made the best of the power of individualism in American 
political culture, affirmed a vision of democratic life across class (if decidedly not 
always racial) lines, and sought a bridge between that individualism and a 
common good. That approach, with all of its potential for mixed results, is 
worth revisiting to consider if, and how, it might provide insight on the new 
problems of our own time. 
There have been and will be moments that do occur, where change is poss-
ible, when the burden of experience offers new insight even as human contradic-
tions remain a constraint. Humanity is always alive with possibility. As the 
sociologist Ulrich Beck, argues, "Skepticism . . . makes everything possible 
again: ethics, morality, knowledge, faith, society, and criticism, but differ-
ently—a few sizes smaller, more tentative, more revisable and more capable 
of learning and thus more curious, more open to the unexpected."66 
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